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Abstract—The necessity to (re-)configure Internet of Things
devices such as smart sensors during their entire lifecycle is
becoming more important due to recent attacks targeting these
devices. Allowing configuration parameters to be changed in any
phase of a smart sensor’s lifecycle allows security updates or
new key material to be applied. Also, the functionality of a
smart sensor can be altered by changing its configuration. The
challenges that need to be considered when enabling the config-
uration of arbitrary parameters are the security and usability
of the configuration interface, the secured storage of confidential
configuration data, and the attestation of successfully applied
configuration updates. Therefore, we present an NFC-based
configuration approach that relies on dedicated secured hardware
to solve these challenges. In addition to a hardware extension for
smart sensors, we also present a secured configuration protocol as
well as a two-layer configuration attestation process to verify the
correct utilization of all transmitted configuration parameters.
Index Terms—Smart Sensor; Configuration; Attestation;
Hardware Security.
I. INTRODUCTION
Sensors are seen as one of the major building blocks
of the Internet of Things (IoT) [1] where devices can be
used to interact with their physical environment only due to
embedded sensors. These sensor-equipped devices have led
to technologies such as wireless sensor networks (WSN) and
high-tech strategies such as Industry 4.0. In these technologies
and high-tech strategies, sensing nodes often perform some
sort of (pre-)processing in order to optimize properties such as
their exactness, energy efficiency, or usefulness. Such sensors
are also denoted as smart sensors [2].
Due to recent attacks targeting these devices, frequent re-
configuration is needed to mitigate certain kinds of attacks [3],
[4]. For example, frequent changes of applied encryption
keys or parameters such as a used elliptic curve could make
attacks harder. Also, security related software updates will be
needed to account for new security requirements. In addition to
security related updates, also updated functionality of devices
can be achieved. Rapidly changing environments, as well
as frequently updated requirements regarding their operation,
require smart sensors to be configurable. Weyer et al. [5] state
that configuring devices will be essential for future Industry
4.0 motivated production systems.
One way to achieve the goal of flexible smart sensors is
to make them self-configuring and adaptive [6]. Lee et al. [7]
suggest self-configuration and self-adjustment as one of five
major building blocks for cyber-physical systems (CPS) used
in Industry 4.0 scenarios. However, self-configuration of smart
sensors is not considered as mature enough to account for
all requirements of industrial scenarios where higher safety
and security standards need to be fulfilled. Therefore, manual
configuration mechanisms that are reliable while providing a
secured update process will be needed for smart sensors.
The European research project IoSense1 addresses the con-
figurability of smart sensors. As envisioned in the IoSense
project, the configuration of smart sensors should be possible
throughout the complete lifecycle of a sensor. The four phases
of a smart sensor’s lifecycle and potential example use-cases
where a (re)configuration is needed are shown in Fig. 1.
To allow smart sensors to be configured during all four
shown lifecycle phases, we propose a Near Field Communica-
tion (NFC)-based configuration approach that uses a dedicated
hardware-based secure element to provide a protected execu-
tion environment for involved security critical code as well as
secured storage for confidential configuration data. For non-
confidential configuration data, storage will be provided by a
general purpose computing environment. Due to these different
storage layers and to provide efficient configuration attestation
with minimal communication overhead, we also propose a
two-layer configuration attestation architecture. Summarized,
the contributions of this paper are:
• We present an NFC-based configuration approach suit-
able for smart sensors used in industrial environments.
To account for the enhanced security requirements of
industrial scenarios, a hardware architecture using ded-
icated hardware-based secure elements in combination
with suitable cryptographic methods are used to provide
data confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity.
• Due to providing unsecured as well as secured storage for
configuration data, and to impose an overhead as small as
possible, a two-layer configuration attestation architecture
is presented in this paper. The configuration protocol is
attestation aware to support the configuration attestation.
1http://www.iosense.eu
Fig. 1. Four phases of a sensor’s lifecycle with configuration scenarios.
To the best knowledge of the authors, neither an attestation
aware configuration approach nor a two-layer configuration
attestation architecture were proposed in other works. The
remainder of this paper is structured as follows. In Section II,
background on involved technologies as well as related work is
discussed. The general configuration and attestation problem,
as well as a system model and corresponding assumptions,
are discussed in Section III. Section IV demonstrates our
proposed hardware-secured configuration approach, Section V
presents the corresponding two-layer configuration attestation
architecture. The presented approach is then evaluated in
Section VI by means of a demonstrator. This paper is then
concluded with Section VII.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
A. Device Configuration
Device configuration is an important topic in the IoT due
to the large number of devices. Many solutions have been
proposed (e.g. [8], [9]) that define interfaces such that devices
can be easily configured via the Internet. However, as most of
these solutions expose the configuration interface of devices
to the Internet without considering protocol and physical
device security, they are not suitable for industrial scenarios.
Steger et al. [10] propose a software update approach for
vehicles that relies on 802.11s mesh networks that allow
parallel updates of multiple cars. However, this approach is
not suitable for industrial smart sensor configuration due to the
following two reasons: (i) Due to many sensors being resource
constraint devices that operate on battery power, 802.11 based
technologies are considered to be too energy consuming for
smart sensor configuration purposes. (ii) The authors consider
adding hardware security modules (HSM) in their approach
but state that such a solution would lead to significant extra
costs. This is, of course, infeasible for smart sensors.
Configuration scenarios involving resource constraint de-
vices often use NFC due to the fact that NFC devices operated
in a passive mode provide excellent energy efficiency. Wu et
al. [11] present an approach to reprogramming computational
RFIDs over the air using the electronic product code pro-
tocol. Serfass and Yoshigoe [12] propose an Android-based
framework for NFC peer-to-peer communication that allows
TABLE I
COMPARISON WITH DEVICE CONFIGURATION RELATED WORK.
Related
Work
Energy
Efficient
Arbitrary
Payload
Secured
Protocol
Tamper
Resistant
Attes-
tation
[8], [9] 7 3 3 7 7
[10] 7 3 3 7 7
[11] 3 7 7 7 7
[12] 3 3 7 7 7
[13] 3 3 3 7 7
[14] 3 7 3 3 7
This work 3 3 3 3 3
transferring arbitrary data. Similar to that, Haase et al. [13]
present an NFC-based configuration framework for sensors
and actuators used in home automation contexts. However,
due to the home automation focus, the security level provided
by that approach is considered as insufficient for industrial
scenarios. Ulz et al. [14] present a key update process for
industrial devices based on NFC. However, this approach does
not allow arbitrary configuration data to be transferred.
None of the presented approaches includes a verification
process to ensure the correct application of new configuration
data. An overview summarizing the related work regarding
device configuration is shown in Table I.
B. Configuration Attestation
The remote attestation of device characteristics such as
hardware properties, operating system, or services is a well-
covered topic in the IoT [15], for wireless sensor networks
[16], and generally for resource constraint devices [17]. Saroiu
and Wolman [18] discuss various scenarios that are affected by
untrustworthy sensor data. The authors also suggest to include
trusted computing hardware such as a trusted platform module
(TPM), Intel’s trusted execution technology (TXT), or ARM’s
TrustZone (TXT and TrustZone either use or closely relate to
TPM functionality [19]) into sensors to provide trusted data.
In fact, most proposed attestation approaches rely on trusted
computing hardware, due to the constraints and assumptions
that are often necessary for software-based attestation [20].
However, many approaches attest static parts of a system, such
as the BIOS, boot loader, or binaries that should get executed,
while we need to attest a configuration that is changing.
Regarding the attestation of changing properties, Kil et
al. [21] propose a method for dynamic system properties
attestation. In their approach, a challenger requests an attes-
tation that is then performed by the attester. The dynamic
properties that are attested are structures in an application’s
memory that need to be defined before deployment of the
application. The method also needs a BIOS that supports core
root of trust measurements which makes it infeasible for smart
sensors. SCUBA, a secure code update by attestation for sensor
networks [22] relies on indisputable code execution which is
a software security measure shown to be susceptible to certain
attacks [20]. A promising approach is so-called property-based
attestation [23] that however requires functionality not yet
included into the TPM specification. As an alternative, the
authors assume a trusted execution environment that is needed
in their approach, which we will include in our proposed
architecture.
C. Near Field Communication (NFC)
NFC is a contactless communication standard based on
several RFID standards. The technology is well-known for its
usage in contactless payment solutions, ticketing, and access
control systems [24]. NFC operates at 13.56 MHz, typically
in ranges of 3-10 cm while supporting bit rates that are
multiples of 106 kbps (up to 848 kbps). Due to the fre-
quency spectrum used, NFC is not susceptible to interference
from other wireless technologies such as WiFi, Bluetooth, or
801.15.4 based protocols. Due to the limited communication
range, NFC provides certain security advantages compared to
other wireless technologies [25]. Although the communication
range of NFC is limited, attacks that allow eavesdropping in
distances of 10 m haven been shown. Therefore, security mea-
sures to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity
of transferred data need to be implemented.
D. Authenticated Encryption (AE)
AE comprises private key cryptography with Message
Authentication Codes (MAC) in a secured way such that
the confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of data can
be provided [26]. The well-known private key cryptogra-
phy algorithm Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) provides
specialized modes of operation such as AES-CCM that are
capable of providing AE. AES can be implemented efficiently
in hardware with respect to performance as well as size
requirements (e.g. Rogawski and Gaj [27]). Therefore, the
usage of dedicated hardware to perform security relevant
operations in smart sensors is highly practicable [28].
E. Secure Element (SE)
The combination of processing units for secured code
execution and secured storage for data and applications is
denoted as SE. In contrast to general purpose CPUs, the
secured code execution environment mitigates exploits based
on flaws such as buffer overflows. In addition to that, the
SE also implements appropriate countermeasures to mitigate
physical attacks. SEs that are capable of mitigating physical
attacks provide so-called tamper resistance [29]. The security
level provided by SEs is assessed by a common criteria (CC)
information technology security evaluation [30] in order to be
able to compare the security provided by SEs.
III. PROBLEM DEFINITION AND SYSTEM MODEL
Before presenting our approach for smart sensor configura-
tion and configuration attestation, we define the problem we
face, and define our system model.
...
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Fig. 2. System model for smart sensor configuration.
A. Problem Definition
When configuring smart sensors, (confidential) configura-
tion data is transferred to a device that can not be fully trusted,
even when trusted hardware components such as a trusted
platform module (TPM) are included in the smart sensor. The
configuration data also needs to be transferred to the device
using a communication channel with potential adversaries.
Therefore, we need to consider the following three problems:
1) To configure a smart sensor, confidential configuration
data needs to be sent using a communication channel
that might be accessible to potential adversaries.
2) A malicious sensor device might read configuration data
and reveals confidential information to a third party.
3) A malicious sensor device might accept a configuration
but does not apply it. Therefore, the correct functionality
of the device is compromised.
To summarize these problems, we assume an adversary that
is able to access and perform malicious operations on both the
communication channel, and the smart sensor.
B. System Model
For our configuration approach we assume the system model
shown in Fig.2 that comprises the following three entities:
Smart Sensor: The smart sensor that needs to be config-
ured. There is no limitation on the number of devices; we
generally assume n smart sensors in our system model.
Mobile Configuration Device: The mobile device used to
update configuration data on smart sensors. In our approach
there is no limitation regarding the number of configuration
devices used, so we assume a number of m mobile configura-
tion devices in our system model.
Configuration Back-End: The back-end manages and ini-
tializes all configuration changes. This means, changes need to
be done done on the back-end from where they are transferred
to the smart sensor using the mobile configuration device. In
our system model, we assume one configuration back-end.
C. Assumptions
Based on our system model, we assume a back-end that
operates as a global configuration storage to be trustworthy
Config Component
Sensor Controller
Secure Element
Sensor
Interface
Network
Interface
Config
Interface
Network
       Non-Confidential
       Configuration
       Confidential
       Configuration
Fig. 3. NFC-based configuration architecture for a smart sensor’s confidential
as well as non-confidential configuration data.
and sufficiently secured against attacks. We further assume that
all configuration changes must be initialized and therefore au-
thorized by this back-end. Thus, the back-end has knowledge
of all smart sensor configuration versions that are configured
and managed by the given back-end.
IV. NFC-BASED CONFIGURATION
Smart sensors need to be configured during their entire
lifecycle as shown in Fig. 1. To account for this requirement,
we propose to use an NFC-based configuration interface for
the following reasons:
• NFC allows ad-hoc connections to be established instead
of exposing the configuration interface to potential adver-
saries located in a network.
• The limited communication range of NFC also offers
advantages in limiting the malicious use of this interface
due to adversaries having to be in close proximity to the
smart sensor in order to use to the configuration interface.
• If the NFC module of the smart sensor is operated in
passive mode, no energy is needed for communication.
The hardware components involved in the configuration
process can even be powered through the NFC field of the
communication partner’s NFC device, which is needed in
certain phases of a smart sensor’s lifecycle (e.g. during
manufacturing of the smart sensor).
A potential drawback of NFC is that there are no secu-
rity measures included in the NFC standard to protect the
confidentiality, integrity, and authenticity of transferred data.
Therefore, we propose to use AE in combination with ticketing
information that is used to verify if a configuration should be
accepted by a smart sensor or not. To perform all involved
cryptographic methods in a secured execution environment,
our approach relies on an SE that is combined with a general
purpose processor as shown in Fig. 3. This Config Component
implements security by isolation approach (e.g. Vasudevan
et al. [31]; normal and secured world) allows execution and
data storage to be split into confidential or critical, and non-
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Fig. 4. Necessary two-layer architecture for configuration attestation due to
allowing data of two confidentiality levels.
confidential or non-critical parts. The responsibility of the SE
and sensor controller in our presented approach are:
SE: The SE offers a secured execution environment for
critical code such as AE. In addition, the SE also offers
secured storage for confidential configuration data that can be
stored in a tamper resistant manner. To enable configuration
transfer via NFC, the SE also includes an NFC interface. That
interface allows the SE to be powered by an NFC field, even
if there is no power source attached to the smart sensor. Due
to the SE providing the NFC interface, confidential data is
directly transferred to the SE and no additional interface for
configuration updates or storage needs to be exposed which
potentially also mitigates so-called API-level attacks that target
these interfaces [32].
Sensor Controller: The sensor controller includes inter-
faces to the sensor hardware, to the network, and to the
SE. Due to the fact that this controller is a general purpose
controller, it also provides an execution environment for non-
critical code as well as storage for non-confidential configu-
ration data.
Having both, secured and unsecured data storage, our
approach is able to handle confidential as well as non-
confidential configuration data. Confidential configuration data
could include information such as keys used for communica-
tion, firmware updates for the SE, or data for local decision
making in a smart sensor. Non-confidential data could, for
instance, represent settings such as the sampling rate of a smart
sensor but also firmware updates for the sensor controller.
Due to having two layers of configuration data with different
confidentiality requirements, the verification process of the
applied configuration update also needs to be done in a two-
layer architecture as shown in Fig. 4. There, LRoT denotes
the local root of trust that is used to attest non-confidential
configuration data. GRoT denotes the global root of trust that
is then used for confidential configuration attestation.
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Fig. 5. NDEF packet structure of transferred configuration data.
Independent of the confidentiality level when storing con-
figuration data, security measures need to be implemented
when transferring the configuration data using NFC to mitigate
eavesdropping, and replay attacks. Therefore, every configura-
tion that is transferred needs to be secured using the security
mechanisms shown in the NFC data exchange format (NDEF)
packet structure (see Fig.5) used in our approach. The fields
included in this NDEF packet are:
• Realtime: The realtime of the device that is sending the
configuration update. This information is used to decide
if a packet will be accepted or rejected by a smart sensor
(see field Validity). This information is not encrypted as
it is added to the NDEF package by the device deploying
the configuration due to most smart sensors not having
time synchronization.
• Cipher Specifications: This field defines the used encryp-
tion algorithm and corresponding key lengths to allow
the smart sensor to use the appropriate algorithms when
decrypting and verifying the package.
• Encrypted payload and MAC: These two fields are
generated by encrypting the plaintext payload and by
calculating the MAC of that same payload.
• Version: To mitigate replay attacks, a version number is
included in the encrypted payload. For a smart sensor to
accept a configuration update, this version number must
be larger than the current configuration version.
• Validity: The validity defines how long a given configura-
tion package is valid to also mitigate replay attacks. The
validity is checked against the included realtime from the
configuration deploying device.
• Sensor ID: The included sensor ID must match the sensor
ID stored in the tamper resistant memory of the SE for
the smart sensor to accept the configuration update.
• Plaintext: This is the transferred configuration data.
• Attestation Info: To allow the LRoT to perform attestation
operations, attestation information is also added to the
transferred data. The used attestation approaches will be
discussed in detail in the next section.
The secured NDEF data structure is used to transfer data
from the back-end to the mobile device as well as when
transferring data from the mobile configuration device to
the smart sensor. Using the same package entails that the
transferred data can not be modified in any way on the mobile
device. Since we consider the mobile configuration device
itself as well as its operator as untrustworthy, only allowing
data to be transferred secured by AE mitigates attacks enabled
by malicious devices or users.
V. TWO-LAYER CONFIGURATION ATTESTATION
Before presenting our two-layer configuration attestation
architecture, we are briefly going to discuss some terminology
related to attestation.
A. Attestation Terminology
Usually in attestation there are two roles, a challenger and
an attestor [33]. The challenger is the entity interested in the
correctness or trustworthiness of a system. That is, the output
of the attestation process. The attestor (often also prover) is the
entity that needs to prove its correctness and trustworthiness
by measuring and attesting its configuration. An attestation
process usually is assisted by some dedicated hardware that
supports trusted computing. The TPM specification of the
trusted computing group (TCG) lists two mechanisms that
are of interest when discussing device attestation: remote
attestation and sealed storage. Remote attestation defines how
to use a TPM’s secured storage, the platform configuration
registers (PCR), to implement an attestation process. Sealed
storage refers to data (information or code) that is stored
encrypted using a key calculated as a function of a TPM’s
PCR values. That is, the data is only unsealed if the attestor
is able to prove its correct state.
B. SE versus TPM
Most attestation solutions require secured hardware to be
used at the attestor. This secured hardware component is a
TPM in most cases. Sadeghi et al. [34] argue that such secured
hardware is too complex and often too expensive for most
resource constraint devices such as smart sensors. The authors
also state that although software-based attestation solutions
have been proposed, at least a basic subset of security features
in hardware will be needed. Therefore, we propose to use an
SE such as a product from Infineon’s SLE78 product family
(see [35]) in our approach for the following three reasons:
1) When using an SE such as Infineon’s SLE78 that was
designed for smart cards, secured hardware can also be
included into smart sensors that are constrained in terms
of size and available energy.
2) Although TPMs with NFC capability have been pro-
posed [36], no currently available TPM offers an NFC
interface. In contrast to that, certain SEs such as from the
SLE 78 family offer an NFC interface and the required
security properties needed for attestation.
3) The applied attestation approach that will be presented
in this paper requires a trusted execution environment
which is not included in the TPM specifications. How-
ever, security controllers are capable of providing such
a tamper resistant execution environment.
C. Two-layer Approach
Our two-layer configuration attestation approach is based on
the fact that the configuration solution presented in Section IV
supports two different levels of confidentiality for configura-
tion data. As shown in Fig. 4, non-confidential configuration
will be attested using the SE included in our proposed config-
uration component while confidential configuration data will
be attested by the trusted back-end.
D. Non-Confidential Configuration Attestation
Non-confidential configuration data that can be changed
on the sensor controller can be either application updates
(binaries), configuration data (e.g. sampling rate), or both.
Since malicious code, as well as malicious configurations, can
be harmful, attestation is necessary for both components. Due
to the different nature of information, we suggest using two
different attestation techniques respectively.
Application (Binaries) are static memory content that is
changed less frequent than configuration data. According to
Yang et al. [37] the size needed for application binaries can
usually be assumed to be two orders of magnitudes larger
than the space required for (configuration) data. Therefore,
we propose to use basic binary attestation where a hash value
is computed over the complete application binaries. Advanced
methods such as pseudo-random memory traversal [38] can
also be implemented to prevent attacks such as memory copy
attacks, or pre-computation and replay attacks. The necessary
information to attest the correctness of updated binaries are
included in the configuration update NDEF package (attesta-
tion info, see Fig. 5) and therefore are also updated in the SE
(LRoT) whenever new application binaries or non-confidential
configuration data are transferred to the SE.
Non-Confidential Configuration Data is also stored in the
sensor controller’s memory. However, since configuration data
is much smaller and attacks such as memory copy attacks are
easy to implement, we propose to use property-based attes-
tation [23] for configuration data. As stated by the authors,
a property-based attestation mechanism requires additional
functionality that is currently not included in the TCG’s TPM
specifications. Therefore, a trusted execution environment is
needed to implement the desired functionality. In our ap-
proach, the trusted execution environment is provided by the
SE. To implement property-based attestation, certificates are
needed for each valid configuration property. The problem of
certificate revocation can easily be solved in our approach by
including certificate information in the configuration update’s
attestation information field.
The two different attestation techniques are then jointly
used to grant or deny network access to the sensor controller.
We suggest achieving this by using sealed storage to protect
code such as the whole network stack, or other information
from being accessed by an unattested sensor controller. By
restricting network access through local attestation instead
of using remote attestation, malicious smart sensors can be
isolated from the network. Thus, such sensors are hindered
from infecting other network devices or start network-based
attacks such as denial-of-service attacks, jamming, or decep-
tion attacks [39], [40]. The decision on which information
to seal in order to protect network access needs to be based
on a trade-off between parameters such as security level, and
overhead. On the one hand, sealing the network stack would
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Fig. 6. Two-layer configuration attestation in detail.
require a sensor controller to prove its correctness only once
before copying the network stack to its own memory. However,
an adversary then could modify binaries or configuration after
having unsealed the network stack. On the other hand, sealing
an encryption key and requiring an attestation every time
before allowing an encrypted packet to be sent, increases the
overhead while still allowing certain kinds of attacks such as
DoS attacks. Since we only present an attestation architecture
in this paper, we refer to future work for a detailed comparison
of different approaches. Independent of the chosen sealing
approach, attestation information is stored in an SE that pro-
vides tamper resistance, attestation information is efficiently
protected from being tampered with. Therefore, adversaries
are not able to manipulate stored attestation information.
E. Confidential Configuration Attestation
Confidential configuration data is secured by the applied
security measures when transferring the data via NFC and
storing that data on an SE that provides tamper resistance.
Therefore, the correctness of these configuration parameters
is assumed in our approach. The attestation of confidential
configuration data to the global configuration database in the
back-end (GRoT) is still required to verify the successful
application of configuration data. That is, any malicious user
that does not apply a configuration update must be detected by
the GRoT. Since the second layer needs to attest configuration
parameters, property-based attestation is used to attest the
correctness of confidential configuration data.
VI. EVALUATION
To show the technical feasibility of our proposed con-
figuration component, the hardware demonstrator shown in
Fig. 7 was realized. This demonstrator comprises two different
controllers. An Infineon XMC4500 microcontroller that is
XMC 4500
SLE 78
Configuration 
App
Fig. 7. Configuration component hardware demonstrator and Android device
running the NFC configuration application.
used as the sensor controller in our approach and an Infineon
SLE 78 [35] that is used as SE. As a mobile configuration
device, we used an NFC-enabled Android smartphone. Using
this demonstrator, configuration update times (reboot of the
system not included) of about 200 ms can be achieved for
configurations consisting of 5-10 configuration parameters
including the necessary overhead imposed by the implemented
security mechanisms.
A. STRIDE Threat Analysis
To highlight the achieved security level, a threat analysis
was conducted that demonstrates the lists the threats (T) that
can be mitigated by countermeasures (C) implemented our
approach. Further, the threats are categorized by the STRIDE
model (Spoofing, Tampering, Repudiation, Information disclo-
sure, Denial of service, Elevation of privilege). Although we
do not claim this threat analysis to be exhaustive, we think the
listed threats represent the most relevant threats for a smart
sensor configuration scenario. Regarding the threat analysis,
we make the following assumptions: (i) We assume the global
configuration database back-end is sufficiently secured against
any kind of attack; therefore, it is considered as trusted entity.
(ii) Also the SE used in our approach is considered as trusted
entity. (iii) Other than that, we assume all other involved
entities as being untrustworthy. T1 (S, R, I, D, E): Adversary
that is trying to perform remote attacks on the configuration
interface. C1: Mitigated by using NFC which requires an
adversary to be in close proximity to the smart sensor. T2
(R, I): Adversary in close proximity is trying to eavesdrop
or manipulate configuration packages. C2: Mitigated by using
AE. T3 (S, D): Adversary in close proximity is trying to use a
captured configuration package to perform replay attacks. C3:
Appropriate countermeasures are included in configuration
package to mitigate these type of attack. T4 (S, R, I, D, E): An
adversary is able to inject malicious code or manipulated con-
figuration data into the sensor controller. C4: When attested,
the sensor controller is not able to unseal its network stack
stored in the SE. Thus, the malicious smart sensor is blocked
from accessing the network. T5 (S, R, D): Malicious code
in the sensor controller performs attacks (e.g. DoS) targeting
other network devices or tries to replicate the malicious code
to other devices. C5: When attested, the sensor controller is
not able to unseal its network stack stored in the SE. Thus,
the malicious smart sensor is blocked from accessing the
network. T6 (D): A malicious user tries to manipulate the
functionality of a smart sensor by not applying a necessary
configuration update. C6: The global configuration database
back-end attests the configuration state of a smart sensor;
therefore, not updated devices can easily be detected. T7 (D):
Adversary in close proximity tries to perform a DoS attack
by continuously sending malicious configuration packages to
the smart sensor. C7: The updates are rejected by the SE.
Normal operation of the smart sensor is not impacted since
the SE is powered through the mobile device’s NFC field;
therefore, no power required by the smart sensor is consumed.
Also, all cryptographic operations to decide if a package
needs to be rejected are performed at the SE, which does not
impact the normal operation of the sensor controller. T8 (S,
T, R, I, D, E): Adversary with physical access to the smart
sensor tries to perform physical and side-channel attacks to
reveal confidential data such as key material or cryptographic
algorithms. C8: The used SE mitigates physical attacks by
implementing appropriate countermeasures. The security level
is certified by CC.
VII. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
In this paper we present a hardware-secured configuration
approach based on NFC that is suitable for both confidential
and non-confidential data alike. Our approach comprises (i)
a component that can be included into future smart sen-
sors as well as into legacy devices and (ii) a NDEF-based
configuration protocol. The protocol includes information to
prevent updates from malicious users and mitigates replay
attacks. By allowing only NFC for configuration changes, the
configuration interface is not exposed to remote attacks from
the network. In addition, we also propose a two-layer con-
figuration attestation architecture to attest the correctness of
applied configuration updates. This architecture is capable of
attesting non-confidential configuration locally using an SE as
well as confidential configuration data remotely using a trusted
global configuration database. The technical feasibility of our
architecture is shown by means of a hardware demonstrator.
In addition to that, the security properties are evaluated in a
STRIDE threat analysis that highlights the increased security.
As future work we plan to investigate different methods to
grant or deny network access for smart sensors regarding their
trade-off between provided security level, and overhead.
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